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Toward Internationally Regulated
Goods: Controlling the Trade in
Small Arms and Light Weapons
Asif Efrat
Abstract Contrary to the general trend of trade liberalization, specific goods—
such as small arms, drugs, and antiquities—have come under increasing international
control in recent decades through a set of international regulatory agreements+ This
article offers a theoretical framework of government preferences on the international
regulation of these goods+ Departing from conventional models of trade policy, the
theoretical framework introduces negative externalities, rather than protection, as the
motivation for restricting trade; it also takes moral concerns into account+ I test this
framework empirically through an original survey of government views on inter-
national small-arms regulation+ Based on interviewing officials from 118 countries,
the survey reveals a large variation in government preferences that conforms to the
theoretical expectations+ I employ this variation to explain why the international reg-
ulation of small arms is weak, despite the fact that these are the deadliest weapons of
all in terms of actual death toll+
The liberalization of markets and world trade is among the most important eco-
nomic trends of the twentieth century+ Since World War II, an ever-increasing num-
ber of countries have chosen to join the world trading system and lower protectionist
barriers, thereby contributing to a significant growth of international trade+1 Yet
the overall trend of increasing trade openness has been accompanied by an over-
looked countertrend+ While world trade has generally become more liberalized in
recent decades, trade in specific goods has become more controlled and signifi-
cantly less free+ Indeed, governments have increasingly restricted and regulated
commercial transactions involving a rapidly growing list of goods, from small arms
to drugs to antiquities+ They have done so through a set of international regulatory
For helpful comments and advice I thank Beth Simmons, Jack Goldsmith, Michael Hiscox, Andy
Kydd, Lisa Martin, Jee Young Kim, participants in seminars and workshops at Harvard University, the
editors of IO, and two anonymous reviewers+ I also thank the Weatherhead Center for International
Affairs for financial and logistic support; Yev Kirpichevsky for his help in conducting the survey; and
Jeff Blossom and Giovanni Zambotti for assisting with the geographic analysis+
1+ Milner and Kubota 2005+ On economic liberalism generally, see Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett
2006+
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agreements that established—rather than dismantled—obstacles to trade+ The pur-
pose of international regulation is to reduce the negative externalities for society
resulting from free trade in these goods, such as fatalities and refugee flows stem-
ming from the proliferation of small arms; crime associated with widespread drug
abuse; and archaeological destruction caused by looting of antiquities+ Yet despite
the severity of the problems it addresses, international regulation has been extremely
controversial+ Governments have sharply disagreed about the extent of—and even
the need for—international control of these goods, and at times the disagreements
resulted in weak and ineffective regulation+
Consider small arms and light weapons+ Small arms, such as rifles and pistols,
are weapons for individual use+ Light weapons, such as heavy machine guns, are
designed for the use of a small crew+ According to estimates, the death toll of
small arms2 far exceeds that of any other weapon, including weapons of mass
destruction+Worldwide, small arms cause at least 200,000 deaths annually in homi-
cides, suicides, and unintentional shootings in nonconflict situations+ They are also
the weapons of choice in most present-day conflicts and are responsible for the
vast majority of direct conflict deaths+ The human toll of small arms also includes
indirect conflict deaths due to disease, starvation, and displacement associated with
armed violence+3 Furthermore, widespread gun violence inflicts various social and
economic costs, including medical treatment, refugee flows, destruction of physi-
cal infrastructure, losses in productivity and foreign investment, political instabil-
ity, trade obstruction, as well as disruption of health care and education+4 Small
arms are widely used for terrorism, organized crime, and gang warfare+ They also
facilitate a large spectrum of human rights violations, including killing, rape, and
torture+5
In 1995 the United Nations ~UN! launched a political process intended to com-
bat the negative effects of small-arms proliferation6 and misuse+ The primary agree-
ment resulting from the UN small-arms process is the Program of Action to Prevent,
Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All
Its Aspects7 ~Program of Action or PoA!, adopted at a UN conference in July
2001+8 The PoA intends to reduce the human suffering and devastating conse-
quences caused by gun violence9 through a set of international guidelines for con-
trolling small arms+ Given their enormous toll, especially in Africa, one would
2+ The term “small arms” in this article includes light weapons as well+ The terms “small arms” and
“guns” are used interchangeably+
3+ See Small Arms Survey 2004, chap+ 6, and 2005, chap+ 9+
4+ See Small Arms Survey 2006, chap+ 8; and Cukier and Sidel 2006, chap+ 2+
5+ Report of the UN Secretary-General on Small Arms ~S020080258!, 17 April 2008+
6+ According to estimates, there are at least 875 million small arms in circulation worldwide+ Civil-
ians own roughly 75 percent of this total ~Small Arms Survey 2007, 39!+
7+ UN Document A0CONF+192015+
8+ United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects,
New York, 9–20 July 2001+
9+ Program of Action, Section I, para+ 2–7+
98 International Organization
expect tight international control of small arms, based on a stringent agreement
with a mechanism to ensure compliance+ Yet the control of small arms as estab-
lished by the PoA is far from such expectations+ The PoA constitutes a loose frame-
work that is hard to reconcile with the magnitude of the problem this document
addresses; it also lacks key attributes of arms control agreements+ First, the PoA
has no legally binding force+ Whereas arms control agreements typically take the
shape of treaties, the PoA is merely a political declaration+ Second, monitoring
and verification arrangements are a cornerstone of arms control agreements such
as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ~NPT!; yet they are absent from the PoA+
The PoA neither grants states the authority to monitor compliance, nor does it
delegate verification authority to a third party+ It merely asks states—on a volun-
tary basis—to provide information on implementation+
The PoA’s weakness is also manifested in certain glaring substantive omis-
sions+ Although nonstate actors bear much of the blame for armed violence, the
PoA fails to ban arms supply to unauthorized nonstate actors+ Without ammuni-
tion, guns cannot threaten, wound, or kill; yet the PoA does not explicitly address
ammunition, thereby dooming the efforts against gun violence to partial failure+ A
UN Review Conference met in 2006 to assess the implementation of the 2001
PoA and possibly establish additional commitments+ However, the negotiations at
the Review Conference failed, and the Conference ended without any outcome
document+
As the PoA itself acknowledges, misuse of small arms “sustains conflicts, exac-
erbates violence, contributes to the displacement of civilians, + + + and fuels crime
and terrorism+”10 Why, then, did governments choose to address such grave prob-
lems through a non-legally binding agreement that lacks a meaningful enforce-
ment mechanism and avoids critical issues? Furthermore, how can one account
for the weakness of the PoA compared with other arms-control agreements? Solv-
ing these puzzles requires an in-depth exploration of the conflicting preferences of
governments over international small-arms regulation+11 The question, in other
words, is why certain governments favor tight international regulation of the trade
in small arms while others wish to maintain the trade uncontrolled+
Existing literature provides no answer to this question+ Small arms have been
“merely a footnote in scholarship + + + on matters of proliferation and arms con-
trol,”12 although they kill far more people than any other weapon+ The starting
point to my analysis is therefore political economy models of trade policy+ These
models, however, focus on protection of industries as the motivation for trade bar-
riers, while I seek to explain regulation aimed at curbing the negative externalities
of trade+ The article thus develops a theoretical framework of government prefer-
10+ Ibid+, para+ 5+
11+ On the key role of state preferences in shaping international outcomes, see Moravcsik 1997+
12+ Kinsella 2006, 100+ The most significant source of information on small arms is a yearbook,
Small Arms Survey, published since 2001 by the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva,
Switzerland+
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ences on international regulation that involves three theoretical innovations+ One
innovation is the replacement of protection with negative externalities as the main
impetus for trade restrictions and control+ Governments favor international regu-
lation, first and foremost, to curb primary externalities—the trade’s negative effects
on their own countries+ A second innovation is moral concerns about secondary
externalities—the trade’s negative effects on foreign countries—contrary to the
focus of conventional trade models on material incentives+ The third innovation is
the government’s role: not only a policy maker, but possibly a market actor—
exporter or consumer+
While the empirical focus of the article is small arms, its theoretical framework
can illuminate the political conflict over other internationally regulated goods+ I
illustrate the theoretical argument by drawing on a variety of cases, including drugs,
antiquities, counterfeit and pirated goods, and diamonds+ Furthermore, the theo-
retical framework links government preferences to cooperation and explains why
some controversies over international regulation resulted in a more robust cooper-
ative outcome than did the controversy over small arms+
To assess the theoretical framework empirically, the article derives a set of
hypotheses with respect to small arms and tests them through an original survey
of government views on international small-arms regulation+ Based on interview-
ing officials from 118 countries, the survey strongly supports the theoretical expec-
tations and reveals a considerable variation in government preferences+ Using this
variation, I explain why the international regulation of small arms is weak+
International Regulation and Its Causes
In recent decades, governments around the world have facilitated commerce by
lowering barriers to trade+ Yet simultaneous with the general trend of trade liber-
alization, a countertrend has taken place: the conclusion of international regula-
tory agreements to control specific goods and to restrict—rather than facilitate—
commercial transactions in these goods+ The regulatory agreements subject the
goods to internationally coordinated rules and practices and set barriers to their
cross-border movement+ For example, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
requires states “to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the produc-
tion, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of
drugs+”13 The 1970 UNESCO Convention14 lays out rules concerning the import,
export, and transfer of ownership of cultural property, aiming specifically at antiq-
uities+ The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme establishes a system of stan-
dardized certificates that accompany international shipments of rough diamonds+
13+ Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Article 4~c!+
14+ Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer
of Ownership of Cultural Property, 1970+
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Why regulate certain goods internationally? While uncontrolled trade in these
goods benefits exporters and consumers, it also generates negative externalities,
that is, negative effects on society+ These negative externalities may result from
the production, sale, or use of the goods+ Examples include gun homicide and
drug-user crime ~externalities from use!; financing rebel military campaigns through
proceeds from diamonds ~externalities from sale!; and archaeological destruction
caused by unauthorized excavation of antiquities ~externalities from production!+
The question, however, is why governments attempt to curb these externalities
through international regulation and why national regulation is insufficient+
Consider small arms+ Most countries have gun-control laws that regulate the
import, sale, and possession of small arms+15 Why, then, is there a need for inter-
national regulation to reduce gun violence? The limited effectiveness of national
gun regulation is a key reason+ Restrictions on the import of small arms may exist
on the books, but customs and border control often fail to detect and seize them;
the increasing volume of trade in recent decades has further diminished the inten-
sity and effectiveness of customs inspections+16 Regulating sale and possession of
small arms is meaningful only if the police can apprehend the violators and courts’
sentences are carried out; in many countries, this is not the case+ Even developed
countries often struggle to fully enforce gun regulation, let alone developing coun-
tries where trained and equipped law enforcement personnel are scarce+ Without
the required technological, operational, and financial resources, gun-control laws
are merely words on paper+17
An alternative approach for reducing armed violence treats the roots of demand
for small arms+ Acquisition and possession of small arms have various causes,
including lack of personal security; poverty and absence of educational and pro-
fessional opportunities, especially among youth; pursuit of individual status; and
sociocultural attitudes ~association of guns with freedom, masculinity, and so on!+
Measures to lower demand may include court and police reform to enhance secu-
rity, community policing, provision of education and employment, and stigmati-
zation of guns and gun violence+18 Demand-side measures may indeed mitigate
armed violence; however, they are costly and extremely complex, particularly for
low-capacity governments+
Given the limited effectiveness of national gun control and the complexity of
demand-side measures, curbing the negative externalities of small arms requires
control at the source, that is, restraining small-arms exports+ To place controls on
the export of small arms, externalities-bearing countries turn to international reg-
ulation+ International regulation augments the national controls of externalities-
bearing countries by inducing externalities-generating countries to establish adequate
controls+ Through international regulation, countries suffering gun violence seek
15+ Cukier and Sidel 2006, chap+ 7+
16+ Raustiala 1999, 119–21+
17+ Cukier and Sidel 2006, 135+
18+ See Small Arms Survey 2006, chap+ 6; and Cukier and Sidel 2006, chap+ 6+
Controlling the Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons 101
to restrain arms-exporting countries and make them reduce the negative external-
ities of their exports+
The same rationale—shifting the burden of control—applies to other internation-
ally regulated goods whose externalities, similar to those of small arms, originate
outside those countries that bear them+ International drug control aims to restrain
drug-exporting countries and make up for the failure of drug-importing countries
to restrict the inflow, possession, and use of drugs+ Poor countries lack the resources
to protect antiquities against looting and prevent their illegal export; international
regulation of antiquities asks rich market-countries to control imports, since those
countries’ demand for antiquities fuels archaeological plunder+ By requiring that
all countries establish appropriate controls, especially those who generate the exter-
nalities, international regulation aligns national practices to curb the negative effects
of the trade+
Government Preferences on International Regulation:
A Theoretical Framework
Given its purpose—alleviating the harmful impact of trade—why is international
regulation hotly contested among governments? Political economy models of trade
policy, while a useful starting point, do not adequately capture the conflict of gov-
ernment preferences on international regulation+ These models typically consider
protection as the primary purpose of governmental restrictions on trade+19 Tariffs
and nontariff barriers intend, first and foremost, to shield industries from loss of
income caused by trade liberalization+With protection as the cornerstone, existing
trade policy models are not suited for studying goods such as small arms and drugs+
For these goods, the primary driver of trade restrictions is not protectionist demands
from local industries that face import competition+ Rather, it is the negative con-
sequences of unregulated trade for society+ The theoretical framework follows trade
models by considering the influence of exporters and consumers, who benefit from
liberalized trade; it departs from conventional trade analysis by introducing pri-
mary and secondary negative externalities as motivations for trade control+
Following Grossman and Helpman,20 I ascribe to the government an objective
function that includes aggregate social welfare as well as support from interest
groups+ Concern for social welfare may reflect policymakers’ personal choice among
policy outcomes and their genuine interest in the well-being of domestic or for-
eign publics+ Such concern may also aim to garner public support and enhance the
government’s prospects of political survival+ The influences on the government
19+ See, for example, the prominent model of Grossman and Helpman “Protection for Sale” ~Gross-
man and Helpman 1994!+ On trade policy models generally, see Gawande and Krishna 2003; and Oat-
ley 2006, chap+ 4+
20+ Grossman and Helpman 2001+
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are thus threefold: wishes of interest groups, wishes of the public, and policymak-
ers’ values+
Exporters and Consumers
Trade scholars have often attributed to exporters and consumers a preference for
free trade+ Exporters support trade liberalization to enhance foreign market access+
Consumers favor free trade because it allows them to enjoy cheap imports and
raises their real incomes+21 The exporters and consumers of the goods addressed
here should have similar preferences+ Some exporters may benefit from the anti-
competitive effects of regulation,22 or they may hope that compliance with regu-
lation would boost their reputation+ Yet I expect that exporters would more often
see international regulatory efforts as a threat to their commercial interests and
would prefer to maintain freedom of trade+ They indeed have good reasons for
concern+ At the extreme, international regulation could prohibit the trade alto-
gether+ For example, elimination of counterfeit and pirated goods is among the
purposes of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
~TRIPS!+ Regulation could also ban certain transactions, could slow or limit export
through administrative requirements, and could increase the costs of production
and transfer of the goods+ For instance, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
requires any export of drugs to receive a separate export authorization; this autho-
rization will be given only upon receipt of an import certificate issued by the
authorities of the importing country+23 Such control measures do not bode well
for exporters, as they make transactions slower and more likely to be blocked+
Similarly, international regulation is detrimental to consumers, as it could raise
the price of the goods, make them less easily accessible, and restrict their avail-
ability+ For example, import controls could prevent consumers of antiquities—art
dealers, museums, and private collectors—from acquiring antiquities that are not
accompanied by documentation of legal export; these are, in fact, the majority of
antiquities+
While exporters and consumers may oppose regulation, they vary in their abil-
ity to organize politically and in their influence on governments+ When exporters
or consumers are few in number or when the adverse impact of international reg-
ulation is sufficiently concentrated, these actors more easily overcome the collec-
tive action problem and organize for political action+ Another obstacle to political
activity, unique to the goods addressed here, is the illegal status of certain export-
ers and consumers+ International regulation aims to make up for the insufficiency
of national regulation; therefore, actors whose activities have been banned by pre-
existing national regulation cannot act through legitimate political channels and
21+ See, for example, Gilligan 1997; and Baker 2003+
22+ Stigler 1971+
23+ Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Article 31+
Controlling the Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons 103
may resort to extra-legal means+ For example, looters cannot legitimately and openly
lobby against international control of antiquities that is motivated by the harm
that they themselves cause; the same for gun-using criminals and terrorists+ By
contrast, legitimate exporters and consumers, such as arms manufacturers and muse-
ums, can lobby against international regulation+
In trade models the government sets trade policy but typically has no commer-
cial interests of its own+24 I, however, consider the possibility that the government
itself is an exporter, through a state-owned industry, or a consumer+ In those cases,
the government’s direct stake in export or consumption provides particularly strong
incentives to pursue uncontrolled or only weakly controlled trade+
Why would governments be more protective of state-owned exporters and more
averse to international regulation than would be the case for privately owned export-
ers? One reason is that state-owned exporters generate revenue for governments+
Uncontrolled trade could therefore mean higher government revenue+Another moti-
vation for supporting state-owned exporters may be their association with goals
greater than financial profit, such as national development or security+ A third pos-
sible reason is that state-owned enterprises—“bureaucrats in business”25 and part
of the state apparatus—may enjoy easy access and close ties to policymakers, which
facilitate lobbying+
There may also be less legitimate reasons for guarding the interests of state-
owned exporters+ Governments often use their control of state firms for patronage,
that is, transfer of wealth to constituents in exchange for political support+ State-
owned enterprises can provide various benefits to the government’s supporters,
such as excess employment and wages or location of production in politically desir-
able regions+26 In addition to political gains, state ownership may generate per-
sonal gains through bribes and channeling of revenues to politicians’ pockets+ The
political and personal benefits yielded by state-owned exporters may increase gov-
ernments’ resistance to international regulation+
Similarly, one should take into account situations in which governments them-
selves consume the goods+ The consumption of guns for domestic security and
national defense is but one prominent example+ By opposing international regula-
tion, governments-as-consumers may wish to maintain their ability to obtain and
use the goods+
Primary Negative Externalities
Primary externalities of trade are the negative effects on one’s own country result-
ing from the production, sale, or use of the goods+ These negative effects are felt
24+ Branstetter and Feenstra’s model of trade policy in China is an exception ~Branstetter and Feen-
stra 2002!+
25+ World Bank 1995+
26+ See Schleifer 1998; and Schleifer and Vishny 1998, chap+ 9+
104 International Organization
mainly by the importing or exporting countries, but third countries may face them
as well+ For example, when country A exports pirated goods to country B, the
results are lost revenue to the legitimate author in country C and the inhibition of
future innovation+
Governments may care about the trade’s negative effects for several reasons+
First, uncontrolled trade could threaten and undermine social welfare+ Policymak-
ers concerned about political survival may therefore perceive a connection between
addressing the externalities of trade and public support+ Voters may vote govern-
ments out of office for failing to solve pressing social problems such as rampant
gun violence or widespread drug abuse+ Second, policymakers may be genuinely
concerned about public welfare and act to curb the externalities out of a sense of
duty and responsibility+ Third, interest groups negatively affected by the trade may
lobby governments to take action+27 Finally, uncontrolled trade may sometimes
harm governments themselves+ For example, supplying guns to rebel groups or
financing these groups through sale of diamonds directly threatens governments’
survival in power+
I expect two influences on governments’ level of support for international reg-
ulation+ First, support for international regulation will increase with the magnitude
of the negative externalities+ For example, the higher the rate of gun violence or
drug abuse, the greater should be the government’s support for international
restraints on the trade in small arms or drugs+ Second, support for international reg-
ulation will decrease as the government’s ability to curb the trade increases+ As
explained above, governments that cannot control the trade and reduce its nega-
tive effects by themselves seek international regulation in order to establish con-
trols at the other end of the chain+ International regulation allows those governments
to make up for their regulatory weakness+ However, the greater the capacity of the
importing ~exporting! country to control the trade on its side, the less dependent it
is on the control by the exporting ~importing! country, and the lower its need for
international regulation+
Secondary Negative Externalities
Concern about the negative effects of trade is not limited to governments whose
countries face these effects+ Certain governments, motivated primarily by values
and moral principles, may care about the trade’s negative impact on foreign coun-
tries+ I term such impact secondary externalities, that is, externalities borne by
countries other than one’s own+ In most cases, concern about secondary external-
ities stems from the negative humanitarian effects of the goods, such as the large-
scale killing and maiming associated with gun proliferation and conflict diamonds+
Other goods raise nonhumanitarian concerns, such as preservation of cultural her-
27+ An example is the initiation of TRIPS by the United States under the influence of American
corporations seeking to curb counterfeiting and piracy; see Sell 2003+
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itage and historical knowledge in the case of antiquities+ Whatever the reason for
concern, the focus of secondary externalities is the harm to others, rather than any
tangible negative effects on one’s own country+
Why would governments hold other-regarding, morally inspired concerns? Such
concerns may reflect policymakers’ values+ These concerns may also be a response
to the perceived desire of elites and mass publics for an ethical foreign policy that
includes curbing the externalities of trade abroad+ From this standpoint, moral action
allows policymakers to garner support and enhance their political power+28 In other
cases, identifiable groups of principled actors lobby governments to initiate or par-
ticipate in an international regulatory campaign+ These actors may be domestic
interest groups as well as transnational networks of nongovernmental organiza-
tions ~NGOs! who share a value-based commitment to worldwide suppression of
trade that they deem harmful and repugnant+ For example, American missionaries
concerned about China’s opium problem played an important role in bringing the
U+S+ government to initiate international drug control in the early twentieth cen-
tury;29 in the late 1990s, a coalition of European NGOs entitled “Fatal Transac-
tions” launched a campaign against conflict diamonds, which ultimately led to the
Kimberley Process+30 How do these actors stimulate concern about the externali-
ties of trade borne by foreign countries? Their main strategy involves educating
policymakers and raising their awareness about the trade and its negative effects+
To educate and raise awareness, these actors take advantage of their expertise and
knowledge about the trade+ They may provide and disseminate information through
various techniques, such as meeting with policymakers, sending letters, providing
oral and written testimonies, and publishing reports+A notable example is the reports
of the NGO Global Witness, which raised awareness about the link between dia-
monds and civil wars and played an important role in the efforts to control the
diamond trade+31
Variation in Government Preferences and Implications for Cooperation
I have identified four influences on government preferences: the anti-regulation
push from exporters and consumers and the pro-regulation pull of primary and
secondary negative externalities+ Combining the four influences along two dimen-
sions, as shown in Figure 1, leads one to expect a large variation in government
preferences on international regulation+
At one extreme are governments concerned about primary or secondary nega-
tive externalities that do not face considerable anti-regulation pressure from export-
28+ Such an interpretation is consistent with studies that tie ethical foreign policy endeavors to the
public’s views+ See, for example, Lumsdaine 1993; and Bass 2008+
29+ Taylor 1969, chap+ 2+
30+ Grant and Taylor 2004+
31+ Global Witness 1998 and 2000+
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ers or consumers ~Quadrant II!+ These governments likely support stringent
international regulation, which offers them significant benefits—curbing the trade’s
negative externalities—at little cost+ At the other extreme are governments that
have little concern over the trade’s negative effects on their own countries or on
foreign countries but are strongly influenced by exporters or consumers who push
for unregulated trade ~Quadrant III!+ These governments are unlikely to support
international regulation, which brings them little benefit in exchange for damage
to exporters or consumers+ Furthermore, international regulation requires these gov-
ernments to bear the costs of improved law enforcement ~for example, systems of
export or import control! to the benefit of foreign countries+ From these govern-
ments’ point of view, international regulation unjustifiably and unnecessarily shifts
onto them the burden of addressing problems that afflict others+ Rather than enhanc-
ing control, they would prefer its relaxation or elimination+
A third group includes governments that are not concerned about primary or
secondary externalities and do not face significant anti-regulation pressure from
exporters or consumers ~Quadrant I!+ These weakly affected governments have
neither strong incentives to support international regulation nor reasons to oppose
it+ I expect them to adopt an intermediate position and favor moderate inter-
national regulation+ Finally, a fourth group consists of cross-pressured govern-
ments ~Quadrant IV!+ On the one hand, primary or secondary negative externalities
motivate these governments to support international regulation+ On the other hand,
exporters or consumers push them toward unconstrained trade+ These govern-
ments likely vary in their preferences+ Their support for international regulation
will increase the heavier the negative externalities are; support for regulation will
decline the greater the influence of exporters or consumers is+
FIGURE 1. Expected government preferences on international regulation
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The problem that emerges from this large heterogeneity of preferences is lack
of shared interest in cooperation+ Certain governments stand to benefit from inter-
national regulation; for other governments, however, international regulation is
highly undesirable, as it yields large costs and only small gains, if any+ Those
governments who are made worse off would be reluctant to endorse stringent reg-
ulation, regardless of what other governments do—they simply have no incentive
to cooperate+ Given such considerable variation in preferences, the distribution of
power plays a key role in shaping the cooperative outcome+ Put differently, in the
absence of shared interest and joint gains, the robustness of international regula-
tion likely reflects the preferences of the powerful actors+
Weak governments favoring cooperation lack the capacity and leverage to bridge
the preference gap+ They cannot bring more powerful governments to accept reg-
ulation that is inconsistent with those governments’ preferences+ The resulting inter-
national regulation is thus likely to be weak+ One possible manifestation of weakness
is limited membership+ Powerful externalities-generating countries may decline to
join the regulatory agreement and thereby significantly diminish its utility+ Antiq-
uities regulation is a case in point+ The attempt of developing countries rich in
archaeology to stem antiquities looting through international regulation met with
fierce resistance from governments of market countries+ For those governments,
international regulation would have adversely affected a thriving art market and
would have harmed consumers of antiquities—those consumers whose demand
motivated plunder+ Regulation would also have entailed a costly law enforcement
apparatus to prevent the import of looted material+ Consequently, Britain, Ger-
many, and Japan, among other market-countries, refused for decades to join the
1970 UNESCO Convention+32 Powerful governments opposed to regulation may
also weaken the form and substance of the regulatory agreement and dilute its
constraining impact+ This has been the case with small arms+ The Program of Action
is a non-legally binding agreement that is loosely worded, leaving considerable
discretion to governments; it also does not delegate authority to third parties for
implementation, dispute resolution, or enforcement+As I elaborate below, the weak-
ness of the PoA reflects the preferences of powerful actors such as the United
States and China+
By contrast, powerful governments favoring cooperation can establish more
robust regulation, given their ability to manipulate the incentives of weak govern-
ments who oppose international control+ Consider TRIPS and the Single Conven-
tion on Narcotic Drugs, both spearheaded by the United States+ Key externalities-
generating countries—exporters of counterfeit and pirated goods or drugs—have
committed to these agreements, unlike the 1970 UNESCO Convention+ Contrary
to the PoA, these agreements are legally binding; establish precise and compre-
hensive commitments; and delegate authority to third parties ~respectively, the
Council for TRIPS and the World Trade Organization ~WTO! Dispute Settlement
32+ Efrat 2009, chap+ 4+
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Body; the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the International Narcotics Control
Board!+
One mechanism that allows powerful governments to overcome the absence
of shared interest is issue linkage, by which “multiple issues are included in
the final settlement in an effort to create a balance where both sides gain enough
to accept the costs+”33 Powerful governments can more easily establish an issue
linkage than weak governments since powerful governments have more comple-
mentary issues to offer to offset losses+ Furthermore, a linkage is likely to encoun-
ter resistance from governments influenced by domestic actors who oppose
regulation+ Powerful governments can pressure or induce resisting governments
to accept the linkage+ TRIPS, for example, met with opposition from developing
countries reluctant to curb counterfeiting and piracy+ In the Uruguay Round indus-
trialized countries, led by the United States, linked TRIPS to agricultural and
textile trade liberalization, which developing countries expected to benefit
from+ The threat of American trade sanctions further softened their opposition to
TRIPS+34
A second mechanism that powerful governments may employ is coercion+
Through rewards and punishments, powerful governments can increase the ben-
efits of cooperation or the costs of noncooperation and thereby induce weaker
governments to accept more robust regulation than they would have preferred+
For example, in the early twentieth century, many countries opposed the U+S+
endeavors for international drug control: colonial powers, in particular Britain
whose colony in India produced opium; drug-producing countries such as Turkey
and Peru; and countries whose pharmaceutical industry manufactured drugs, such
as Germany and Switzerland+35 Pre–World War II, the conflicting preferences
resulted in a limited international regulatory framework that fell short of the Amer-
ican ambition+ Only as a superpower after World War II could the United States
pressure other countries to accept more stringent regulation by tying drug control
to economic and political support+36
Powerful pro-regulation governments can use coercion not only to establish tight
international regulation but also to enhance compliance with it+ The U+S+ govern-
ment publishes annual blacklists assessing the compliance of countries worldwide
with their obligations to tackle drugs as well as counterfeiting and piracy+ Coun-
tries judged to have failed demonstrably in meeting their obligations face the threat
of punitive economic measures, such as withholding of aid and trade sanctions+37
In contrast, governments of developing countries plagued by gun violence or loot-
ing of antiquities can do little to pressure more powerful countries to comply with
the relevant regulatory agreements+
33+ Davis 2004, 156+
34+ Sell 2003, 109–10+
35+ McAllister 2000, 32–34, 66– 67+
36+ Bewley-Taylor 1999, 46– 47, 60– 61+
37+ See ibid+, 202–3; Mertha 2005; and Sell 2003, chap+ 6+
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Government Preferences on International Regulation
of Small Arms: Hypotheses
Building on the theoretical framework, this section develops a set of hypotheses
about the international regulation of the small-arms trade+ I first consider the anti-
regulation influence of exporters and consumers and then examine the pro-regulation
influence of the trade’s primary and secondary externalities+
Exporters
More than 1,200 companies in more than ninety countries are involved in some
aspect of small-arms production+38 Of those, thirty to thirty-five countries export
small arms with annual sales of more than $10 million+ The documented value of
all small-arms exports in 2003 ~based on reports to UN Comtrade! was about $2 bil-
lion+According to estimates, the total annual value of the trade in small arms reaches
$4 billion+39
I expect small-arms exporters to pursue uncontrolled trade, since international
regulation of small arms could adversely affect their business+A major concern for
exporters is the possible establishment of international transfer-controls: common
standards for controlling the export, import, and transshipment of small arms+ These
controls would reduce the likelihood of receiving the authorizations necessary for
transferring arms and discontinue the practice of indiscriminate arms sales+ For
example, the competent national authorities would not approve an arms export if
the arms might be used for human rights violations, fuel conflict, or to undermine
development+ From the exporter’s point of view, such screening means lost income+
Transparency on small-arms transfers is another regulatory measure with a possi-
ble detrimental effect on arms exports: it would increase the pressure on exporters
to avoid transferring arms that are at risk of being misused+ Transparency could also
result in a more careful scrutiny of requests for export licenses and a lower rate of
approvals+ Furthermore, international regulation might increase the costs of pro-
duction+ For example, an obligation to mark small arms with laser, intended to facil-
itate the identification of any weapon, could impose a financial burden on exporters+
For many exporters, international controls on small arms could mean obstruc-
tion of sales and lost revenue+ To what extent can exporters shape the government’s
preference? In most countries the small-arms industry includes a handful of export-
ers, often only one or two major firms, thereby reducing the costs of organizing
politically and avoiding a collective action problem+ Another relevant characteris-
tic of the arms industry is the prevalence of state ownership+ In seventeen out of
thirty-two exporting countries included in this study, the state is the sole or main
owner of the small-arms industry, and this ownership structure likely affects gov-
38+ Small Arms Survey 2004, 7+
39+ Ibid+ 2006, chap+ 3+
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ernments’ calculations+ I expect governments to be especially protective of state-
owned arms exporters and less supportive of international regulation that could
threaten their commercial interests+
Yet “@a#rms sales are far more than an economic occurrence + + + arms sales are
foreign policy writ large.” 40 Throughout the Cold War, both superpowers used
arms transfers to establish leverage and to bolster friendly regimes or undermine
unfriendly ones+41 Today, politically motivated arms transfers still constitute a tool
of statecraft at the hands of arms-exporting countries, including the United States,
China, and Israel+42 International regulation threatens to constrain this political
use of arms+ Transparency on small-arms transfers may discourage arms supply to
rebel groups or repressive governments+ A ban on arms supply to unauthorized
nonstate actors could also significantly hamper the political utility of arms trans-
fers+ Governments of exporting countries who are interested in maintaining this
foreign policy tool are unlikely to support international regulation of small arms+
In sum, the two considerations—commercial interests of the arms industry
reinforced by the political use of arms transfers—point governments of exporting
countries in the same direction: preference for unregulated trade in small arms+
H1: Governments of arms-exporting countries, in particular where the small-
arms industry is state-owned, are less likely to support international regulation of
small arms.
Consumers
Consumers of small arms are numerous and varied+ Armed groups—such as reb-
els, criminals, and terrorists—have an obvious interest in opposing regulation+ How-
ever, these are precisely the consumers that governments would like to prevent
from obtaining arms+ Given that their activity is illegal and, in fact, is the motiva-
tion for regulation, I do not expect their preference for free trade in arms to affect
government preferences+
What about law-abiding civilian gun owners? The UN small-arms process focuses
on armed groups, rather than civilians+ However, civilians may be affected as well
if regulation raises prices+ Moreover, some countries, such as Mexico, believe that
easy access of civilians to arms makes those arms more likely to fall into the wrong
hands and increases the risk of gun violence+ Therefore, these countries would
have liked to establish international guidelines restricting the possession and use
of small arms by civilians ~for example, prohibition on civilian possession of auto-
matic weapons and limitation on the number of weapons that civilians may pos-
sess!+ Civilian gun owners are thus likely to oppose international regulation of
40+ Pierre 1982, 3+ Emphasis in original+
41+ See ibid+; and Krause 1991+
42+ See Byman and Cliff 1999; and Klieman 1992+
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small arms+ For the most part, however, gun owners are not politically organized+
In only a handful of countries, most notably the United States, do gun owners
have politically active lobbies that guard their interests+ Such lobbies—the National
Rifle Association ~NRA! being the most prominent—may pressure governments
to resist international regulation+
Governments themselves are major consumers of small arms for internal and
external security+ I argue that nondemocratic governments in particular are less
likely to favor international small-arms regulation because of the centrality of
domestic repression for their social control and political survival+ Numerous stud-
ies have shown that nondemocracies either engage in overt repression and abuse
of personal integrity rights or establish a permanent threat of repression through a
state police machinery+43 In the absence of alternative noncoercive means for social
control, such as popular legitimacy of the regime, nondemocratic governments rely
on the threat or use of forceful measures to ensure the population’s obedience and
stifle dissent+ Released from constraints on the domestic use of force, such as free
elections and judicial review, they also have greater opportunity to engage in repres-
sion with impunity+
Since forceful repression—threatened or realized—is essential for the function-
ing and survival of nondemocratic governments, their dependence on the supply
of small arms is greater than that of democracies+ Democratic governments obvi-
ously require small arms as well for maintaining law and order and for national
defense, but they typically do not draw a direct link between arms supply and the
regime’s domestic viability+All else equal, the ramifications of regulating the small-
arms trade are less far-reaching and threatening for democracies than they are for
nondemocratic governments, whose ability to govern relies on their repressive
capacity+ It is this reliance that makes nondemocracies more sensitive than democ-
racies to any interference with their arms supply+ If international regulation makes
guns and ammunition less easily available, the survival of a nondemocratic regime
may be imperiled+44 Moreover, the dependence on arms leaves nondemocratic gov-
ernments vulnerable to pressure+ External actors could potentially use international
regulation to restrict the supply of arms to these governments+
H2: Nondemocratic governments are less likely to support international regula-
tion of small arms compared with democracies.
Primary Negative Externalities
The theoretical framework has suggested that governments’ support for inter-
national regulation should increase with the magnitude of the externalities that
43+ See, for example, Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; and Regan and Henderson 2002+
44+ Lai and Morey 2006 make a similar argument regarding the sensitivity of nondemocracies to
reduction in military aid+
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their countries bear+ How can one measure the primary negative externalities of
small arms? Uncontrolled trade in small arms has both immediate and distant
effects+ Homicide, crime, and various forms of collective violence are immediate
results of gun availability and misuse+45 I use homicide rates to measure the imme-
diate negative effects of small arms+46 Small-arms proliferation also has more dis-
tant effects, such as refugee flows, damage to public utilities, and disruption of
education+ I use refugee outflows to measure the wider negative effects of small
arms+
H3: High homicide rates or large refugee outflows increase governments’ support
for international regulation of small arms.
Governments’ support for international regulation also depends on their capac-
ity to control small arms, and the two should be negatively correlated+ The weaker
the capacity for national control, the greater the government’s reliance on inter-
national regulation+ Controlling gun import and possession requires both trained
personnel and technical equipment; it entails effective customs, police, and licens-
ing authorities+ These are less likely to exist in poor countries with underdevel-
oped bureaucratic infrastructure and weak law enforcement+ Unable to control
small-arms import and possession, governments of poor countries are likely to
support international regulation in order to tackle the problem at the source by
curbing small-arms exports+
H4: The poorer the country, the greater its government’s support for international
regulation of small arms.
Secondary Negative Externalities
Secondary externalities are the externalities borne by foreign countries+ For small
arms, the source of concern about secondary externalities is the devastating human-
itarian effects of gun proliferation and misuse, from fatalities to refugee flows to
stifled development+ Governments with a humanitarian foreign policy agenda, such
as those of Japan, Canada, and many European countries, are thus likely to treat
small arms as a pressing humanitarian concern+ I expect them to support inter-
national regulation of small arms in order to curb gun violence abroad+
I use provision of humanitarian aid as an indication of humanitarian motivation+
H5: The greater its provision of humanitarian aid, the stronger the government’s
support for international regulation of small arms.
45+ Cukier and Sidel 2006, chap+ 2+
46+ I use overall homicide rates rather than gun homicide rates since reliable data on the latter are
unavailable for nearly half the countries included in this study+
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In addition, I control for the origin of the legal system+ Recent research has
shown that common law countries are more cautious about making international
legal commitments+47 Common law should therefore be associated with weaker
support for international regulation of small arms+
Empirical Testing
I test the hypotheses through an original survey of government views on the inter-
national regulation of small arms+ The survey included interviews with officials
from 118 countries, conducted in June–July 2006 in New York during and imme-
diately following the UN Review Conference on Small Arms ~with the exception
of eight telephone interviews and one email interview!+ Respondents came from
ministries of foreign affairs, defense, justice, and interior as well as from police
and military forces+ In most cases one official was interviewed from each country;
in twelve cases two or three officials from the same country were interviewed
jointly+ All respondents received the questionnaire in advance to allow them to
prepare for the interview+ The questionnaire asked respondents to provide their
countries’ views on the UN small-arms process+ The questions addressed the 2001
Program of Action as well as proposed regulatory measures not included in the
PoA+ See the Appendix for selected survey questions; Table A1 lists the countries
included in the survey+
I first paint the overall picture through statistical and geographic analysis+ I then
shed light on the variation in government preferences by discussing the responses
to the survey questions+ Respondents were promised anonymity; the text below
identifies them only by country+
Survey Results: Statistical Analysis
The theoretical framework has suggested that government preferences would vary
from weak to strong support for international regulation ~see Figure 1!+ To con-
struct this continuum with respect to small arms, I combine three survey questions
whose subject was the general characteristics of the UN small-arms process: the
scope of the process, the level of obligation: political or legal commitments, and
the compliance mechanism ~Q3, Q4, and Q6 in the questionnaire!+ Combining the
three questions created a 0 to 5 scale of government support for international reg-
ulation ~regulation!+ 0 indicates a government preference for weak regulation: a
limited UN process that addresses the illicit small-arms trade without regulating
the legal trade in small arms, political rather than legal commitments, and the exist-
ing compliance mechanism ~voluntary self-reporting on implementation!; 5 indi-
47+ See Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006; and Simmons 2009, chap+ 3+
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cates government support for strong regulation: a comprehensive UN process
covering the legal small-arms trade, coupled with legally binding commitments
and a stronger compliance mechanism+
In addition to the composite variable regulation, I use two individual ques-
tions as dependent variables+ The question on the scope of the UN process ~Q3! is
the most important question in the survey, because it asked directly whether the
small-arms trade should be regulated+ scope ranges from 0 to 2: 0 means a gov-
ernment preference for limiting the UN process to the illicit trade and excluding
the legal trade; 2 means a preference for addressing both the legal and the illicit
trade+ The question about transparency ~Q8! represents those survey questions con-
cerned with specific regulatory measures+ Respondents were asked whether their
country supported the establishment of an international transparency mechanism
for small-arms transfers+ Transparency ranges from 0 to 2: 0  lack of support
for transparency; 2  full support for transparency+
Measures and data sources for the explanatory variables are as follows+
• arms exporter+ Since the impact of state-owned arms exporters is
expected to be different from that of privately owned exporters, I use two
dummy variables+ The first indicates whether ~1! or not ~0! a country has
state-owned arms exporters; the second indicates whether ~1! or not ~0! a
country has privately owned arms exporters+ Only the variable for state-
owned exporters achieved statistical significance and is shown in Tables 1
and 2+48
• democracy+ The variable ranges from 10 ~autocracy! to 10
~democracy!+49
• refugees+ Number of refugees by country of origin in 2005+50
• homicide rate+ Recorded homicide per 100,000 inhabitants in 2005 or
most recent year available+51
• ln gdp per capita+ Log of a country’s gross domestic product ~GDP! per
capita in 2005+52
• humanitarian-aid provision+ The share of humanitarian aid in bilateral
Official Development Assistance that a country provided in 2006+53
48+ Small Arms Survey 2006 and the NISAT database of small-arms transfers were used to identify
countries that export small arms worth at least $10 million annually ~based on 2003 sales data!+ Data
on the ownership of the small-arms industry are from Jane’s World Defence Industry 2004; Kiss 2004;
Weidacher 2005; and Saferworld 2002+
49+ The source is Polity IVd+
50+ The source is UNHCR 2006+
51+ The source is United Nations Surveys of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Sys-
tems; and Cukier and Sidel 2006+
52+ The source is IMF World Economic Outlook Database 2006+
53+ The source is OECD Statistics+
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• common law+ The variable indicates whether ~1! or not ~0! a country’s
legal system is based on the common law+54
Table 1 presents the results of an ordered logit analysis+ Models 1 to 3 use ref-
ugees to measure the negative externalities of small arms; Models 4 to 6 use
homicide rate+ The results provide strong evidence for all five hypotheses+ Gov-
ernment support for international regulation increases with democracy (H2),
humanitarian-aid provision (H5), as well as refugees and homicide rate
~H3!+ In line with H1, state-owned arms exporter reduces government sup-
port for international regulation+ Consistent with H4, ln gdp per capita is neg-
atively associated with support for regulation, indicating the need of poor countries
to make up for their low capacity for gun control through international regula-
tion+ As expected, common law is negatively correlated with government sup-
port for international regulation+
Table 2 shows large substantive effects of the different variables on government
preferences over the international regulation of small arms+
Changing the democracy score from perfect autocracy to perfect democracy
increases the expected probability of support for strong regulation ~regulation
 5! by 0+52+ For example, when democracy  10 and all other variables are
at their mean, Pr~regulation  5! is 0+11; when democracy  10, Pr~regula-
tion  5! is 0+63+ This is a very considerable substantive effect+ state-owned
arms exporter has a large effect as well, reducing the probability of support for
strong regulation by 0+29+ Raising refugees from 0 to Liberia’s refugees increases
the probability of support for strong regulation by 0+26+ Shifting from France’s
homicide rate to Brazil’s much-higher rate increases the probability of a prefer-
ence for strong regulation by 0+36+ Lowering ln gdp per capita from that of
Switzerland to that of Mali leads to an increase of 0+45 in the probability of favor-
ing strong regulation+ Increasing humanitarian-aid provision from 0 to Norway’s
level raises the probability of support for strong regulation by 0+41+ common law
is associated with a decrease of 0+23 in the probability of support for strong
regulation+
Robustness Checks
As an alternative measure of small-arms exporters, I used the logged ratio of small-
arms exports to total exports+55 Consistent with H1, the higher the ratio of small-
arms exports to total exports, the lower the support for international regulation
~significant at 0+1 level!+
Effective gun control requires bureaucratic infrastructure for licensing, registra-
tion, and so forth+ Instead of GDP per capita, national capacity to control guns
54+ The source is La Porta et al+ 1999+
55+ The value of small-arms exports in 2003 is from Small Arms Survey 2006; the total value of
exports in 2003 is from WTO Trade Statistics+
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TABLE 1. Determinants of government preferences on international regulation of small arms
Variables
Model 1
REGULATION
Model 2
SCOPE
Model 3
TRANSPARENCY
Model 4
REGULATION
Model 5
SCOPE
Model 6
TRANSPARENCY
state-owned arms exporter 1+383***
~0+513!
1+403**
~0+653!
3+079***
~0+83!
0+925*
~0+506!
1+1*
~0+663!
2+555***
~0+751!
democracy 0+138***
~0+033!
0+156***
~0+042!
0+198***
~0+047!
0+15***
~0+038!
0+148***
~0+049!
0+185***
~0+049!
refugees 5+05e-06*
~2+78e-06!
7+43e-06*
~4+36e-06!
7+4e-06
~7+58e-06!
homicide rate 0+06**
~0+027!
0+057*
~0+032!
0+031
~0+036!
ln gdp per capita 0+445***
~0+165!
0+403**
~0+201!
0+392
~0+25!
0+205
~0+199!
0+166
~0+254!
0+233
~0+262!
humanitarian-aid provision 14+911**
~6+494!
21+967**
~9+368!
28+493*
~16+325!
13+86**
~6+448!
19+482**
~9+29!
26+116
~16+305!
common law 1+006**
~0+44!
0+824*
~0+497!
0+85
~0+711!
1+095**
~0+511!
0+952*
~0+583!
0+821
~0+714!
Cut 1 5+926 3+395 6+06 3+5 1+035 4+394
Cut 2 5+016 2+847 4+407 2+477 0+462 2+736
Cut 3 4+264 1+59
Cut 4 3+464 0+9
Cut 5 2+797 0+004
Observations 118 118 114 94 94 92
Prob.x2 0+00 0+00 0+00 0+00 0+00 0+00
Log-likelihood 161+881 87+276 50+899 133+453 69+047 46+009
Notes: Ordered logit regressions+ Standard errors in parentheses+ *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%+ Independent variable for privately owned arms
exporter not reported+
TABLE 2. Substantive effects on government support for international regulation of small arms
DPr
~REG+0!
DPr
~REG+1!
DPr
~REG+2!
DPr
~REG+3!
DPr
~REG+4!
DPr
~REG+5!
state-owned arms exporter: No r Yes 0+11
~0+02, 0+27!
0+09
~0+02, 0+19!
0+08
~0+02, 0+16!
0+03
~0+01, 0+08!
0+03
~0+1, 0+01!
0+29
~0+45, 0+09!
democracy: 10 r 10 0+27
~0+5, 0+09!
0+17
~0+28, 0+05!
0+11
~0+2, 0+04!
0+03
~0+1, 0+03!
0+05
~0, 0+12!
0+52
~0+32, 0+68!
refugees: 0 r Liberia 0+04
~0+09, 0!
0+04
~0+1, 0!
0+06
~0+13, 0!
0+08
~0+16, 0!
0+04
~0+12, 0!
0+26
~0+01, 0+48!
homicide rate: France r Brazil 0+06
~0+13, 0+01!
0+07
~0+15, 0+01!
0+1
~0+2, 0+02!
0+08
~0+17, 0+01!
0+04
~0+15, 0+02!
0+36
~0+06, 0+61!
ln gdp per capita: Switzerland r Mali 0+15
~0+34, 0+03!
0+12
~0+25, 0+02!
0+11
~0+21, 0+02!
0+08
~0+14, 0+02!
0+01
~0+03, 0+06!
0+45
~0+12, 0+7!
humanitarian-aid provision: 0 r Norway 0+05
~0+11, 0+01!
0+06
~0+12, 0+01!
0+09
~0+17, 0+01!
0+12
~0+21, 0+01!
0+09
~0+18, 0!
0+41
~0+04, 0+63!
common law: No r Yes 0+07
~0+01, 0+16!
0+06
~0+01, 0+14!
0+06
~0+01, 0+14!
0+05
~0+01, 0+09!
0+01
~0+05, 0+02!
0+23
~0+4, 0+05!
Notes: The table reports the change in expected probability of each value of regulation resulting from changes in the explanatory variables+ Calculations were conducted using
Clarify ~Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001! based on Model 1 in Table 1, with the exception of homicide rate ~Model 4!+ 95% confidence intervals in parentheses+
was measured using the Bureaucratic Quality indicator from International Coun-
try Risk Guide+ Like GDP per capita, bureaucratic quality is negatively correlated
with support for international regulation ~significant at 0+01 level!+
To examine whether a country’s general inclination for cooperation influences
the regulation preference, a variable indicating IO membership was included+56
The variable was not statistically significant and did not affect the results+
I also considered the possibility that preferences on international regulation of
small arms simply reflect domestic approaches to gun control+ This, however, is
not the case+ For example, Finland and Switzerland have relatively liberal gun
laws domestically and high levels of civilian gun possession,57 yet they prefer strong
international regulation of small arms ~regulation  5 for both countries!+ By
contrast, gun control in China and Egypt is very strict, yet both countries prefer
weak international regulation of small arms ~regulation 0 and 1, respectively!+
Cross-Regional Variation
To examine cross-regional variation in preferences, I recoded regulation into a
three-level measure: preference for weak, moderate, or strong international regu-
lation of small arms ~corresponding to the values 0–1, 2–3, 4–5 of regulation!+
Figure 2 shows government preferences on the world map+
Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America are the regions in which small arms cre-
ate the largest negative externalities+ For example, gun homicide rate in South
Africa in 2002 was 26+1 ~per 100,000! and the equivalent rate for Colombia was
51+8 ~compared with 0+35 in Norway!+ As the regions most negatively affected by
gun proliferation and misuse, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America strongly sup-
port the international regulation of small arms+ Europe, motivated primarily by
humanitarian concerns about gun violence worldwide, is also largely supportive
of strong international regulation+
The Middle East, by contrast, favors weak international regulation+ This prefer-
ence stems from the nondemocratic nature of most Middle Eastern governments
coupled with the limited negative externalities of small arms on their territories+
For example, gun homicide rate in Egypt in 2005 was merely 0+14+ The region is
also host to three major exporting countries with state-owned arms industries: Egypt,
Iran, and Israel+
Small arms cause much more limited problems in East and South Asia than in
Sub-Saharan Africa+ For example, gun homicide rate in Thailand in 2002 was 3+22+
Moreover, governments in East and South Asia have, on average, greater capacity
to tackle gun violence than African governments+ Hence their cautious approach
56+ The number of international organizations in which a country was a member in 2000, Corre-
lates of War data+
57+ Small Arms Survey 2007, 47+
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to international regulation+ In addition, China, India, and Pakistan are major export-
ing countries with state-owned arms industries+
The Pacific holds an intermediate position+ The region has suffered the negative
effects of small arms availability and misuse, but stringent regulation might over-
burden the tiny bureaucracies of the small island states+ The common law tradi-
tion also weakens the region’s support for international regulation+
In addition to cross-regional variation, some variation exists within regions as
well+ Japan and South Korea, both aid donors with a humanitarian dimension to
their foreign policy, are more supportive of regulation than most countries in their
region+ So is Sri Lanka, who faces larger negative externalities than its neighbors
due to a prolonged civil war+ Algeria, Libya, and Morocco are indirectly affected
by the gun problems of their African neighbors; hence, they favor stronger regu-
lation than other Arab countries+ France, with a large state-owned arms industry,
exhibits a more cautious approach to international regulation compared with other
Western European countries+
Survey Results: Qualitative Analysis
The survey reveals a large variation in preferences on international regulation of
small arms that conforms to the theoretical expectations+ Figure 3 illustrates this
FIGURE 2. Government preferences on international regulation of small arms
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variation+ Countries are placed in the matrix according to the corresponding influ-
ences on their preferences+ Each country’s regulation score, based on the sur-
vey data, is in parentheses+
The model predicts strong support for international regulation from govern-
ments that face the primary negative externalities of small arms+ This is indeed
the case with Colombia ~regulation 5!, Somalia ~regulation 5!, and other
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America that suffer from rampant gun
violence+ Respondents from these countries emphasized the high costs of gun vio-
lence in terms of human life, crime, instability, and stifled development+ Accord-
ing to the Kenyan respondent, the weapon of mass destruction in his country is
not a nuclear bomb; rather, it is the Kalashnikov+ These countries therefore sup-
port stringent international regulation of small arms+ The Liberian respondent, for
example, explained that “by controlling arms, by reducing arms, by ensuring that
arms are not in the hands of nonstate actors but in the hands of responsible people
+ + + Liberia will enhance, protect, and consolidate its peace+” In particular, these
countries are in favor of regulating the legal small-arms trade+ They believe that
the legal and the illicit trade are two sides of the same coin since most illicit weap-
ons begin their lives as legal weapons+ Therefore, these countries reject attempts
to distinguish between the legal and the illicit trade and argue that a focus on the
illicit trade alone would undermine the UN process+ In their view, regulation of
the legal trade is necessary for holding arms suppliers accountable and for pre-
venting the provision of arms to actors who would misuse them+
FIGURE 3. Variation in government preferences on international regulation of
small arms
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Respondents also expressed disappointment over the political nature of the Pro-
gram of Action, arguing that a legally binding instrument would have been more
effective+ The Brazilian respondent, for example, maintained that an issue as impor-
tant, complex, and sensitive as small arms should have been addressed through
legally binding commitments+ Similarly, the respondents from Mexico and Tanza-
nia, among others, identified the PoA’s compliance mechanism as a fundamental
weakness+ They expressed their governments’ interest in strengthening this mech-
anism and exerting more pressure on countries to comply+ African respondents
particularly emphasized their governments’ inability to tackle gun violence, mak-
ing it imperative to restrain arms suppliers through international regulation+ The
Somali respondent, for example, explained that the meager resources of his gov-
ernment and Somalia’s large territory make the disarming of militias extremely
difficult, and therefore international controls are necessary+ African respondents
asserted, however, that the PoA does not establish effective restraints, especially
in light of its failure to ban arms supply to unauthorized nonstate actors and the
neglect of ammunition+
The model predicts that governments concerned about secondary externalities
would support stringent international regulation+ This is indeed the case with Japan
~regulation  5!, Sweden ~regulation  4!, and other countries that provide
humanitarian aid+ Respondents from these countries explained their governments’
interest in international regulation primarily in humanitarian and moral terms or
as part of their concern for global security or human security+ The British respon-
dent, for example, explained that “the major motivator is a moral motivator + + +
proliferation of small arms is causing major havoc in the developing world + + +
from a moral position, we want that stopped+” Similar to countries bearing pri-
mary externalities, humanitarian-motivated countries tend to prefer comprehen-
sive regulation that would address the legal as well as the illicit trade in small
arms+ They support legally binding commitments, a stronger compliance mecha-
nism than the existing one, and various regulatory measures, including transpar-
ency and international transfer-controls+
The model predicts that governments guarding the interests of state-owned arms
exporters would favor weak international regulation of small arms+ This is indeed
the case with China ~regulation 0!, Egypt ~regulation1!, and other coun-
tries with state-owned arms exporters+ Respondents from these countries expressed
interest in maintaining freedom of trade and exhibited concern about the implica-
tions of international regulation, especially what they regarded as unnecessary con-
straints on legitimate arms-exports+ Accordingly, they argued that international
regulation should be limited to the illicit trade in small arms, leaving the regula-
tion of the legal trade to national authorities+ They also considered strengthening
the PoA’s compliance mechanism unnecessary, unfeasible, or even counterproduc-
tive+ The Egyptian and Iranian respondents, for instance, maintained that stronger
enforcement would be unrealistic since many countries lack the capacity to imple-
ment the PoA+ Respondents also held strong reservations on the proposals to estab-
lish a transparency mechanism for small-arms transfers or a ban on arms transfers
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that might be used for human rights violations+ They considered such measures
unnecessary or impractical+
The model predicts that governments guarding the interests of consumers would
favor weak international regulation+ This is indeed the case with Syria ~regula-
tion1!, Belarus ~regulation 0!, and other nondemocratic governments who
are anxious to secure their ability to acquire arms and to prevent international
regulation from becoming a means of pressure+ Respondents representing these
governments emphasized that countries relying on arms imports should enjoy access
to arms and that international regulation should not compromise their security and
ability to maintain law and order+ Specifically, respondents voiced their concern
that a link between the legal and the illicit trade might be abused for political
purposes, allowing external actors to meddle with their countries’ national secu-
rity+ The Syrian respondent, for example, argued that such a link would be used to
deprive Syria of arms because of its ties to Iran and Palestinian groups+ Therefore,
respondents insisted that the UN process should be limited to the illicit trade and
exclude the legal trade+ They also vehemently opposed the establishment of trans-
fer controls that, in their view, might be misused for political pressure by denying
arms to governments labeled as “human rights violators+”
The model predicts that weakly affected governments would support moderate
international regulation+ Indonesia, Peru, and Botswana do not export small arms;
they face relatively low-scale problems of gun violence and thus derive limited
benefits from the UN small-arms process+ As expected, they favor moderate inter-
national regulation of small arms ~regulation  3 for all three countries!+
Consistent with the theoretical expectation, cross-pressured governments vary
in their preferences+ Certain governments balance the interests of exporters vis-
á-vis their country’s gun problem or concerns about gun violence abroad+ When
the arms industry is private, the government’s interest in protecting it is weaker
than for a state-owned industry+ In these cases, pro-regulation incentives may pre-
vail over the commercial interests and tilt the balance toward support for regula-
tion+ For example, the respondent from Austria ~regulation  5! indicated that
the arms industry had expressed concerns about international regulation, yet these
were dispelled by a government pursuing humanitarian foreign policy goals+ By
contrast, India balances the desire to mitigate its terrorism problem against the
interests of a state-owned arms industry, resulting in a preference for moderate
international regulation ~regulation  2!+ Cuba holds a similar preference+ The
Cuban government cannot fully control inflows of guns and hopes that inter-
national regulation will alleviate this problem, but not at the price of risking the
government’s own arms supply+
The U+S+ government is also cross-pressured+ Controlling small arms could reduce
the risk to American soldiers overseas and is consistent with the humanitarian aspect
of U+S+ foreign policy+ Yet international regulation could potentially harm Ameri-
can gun manufacturers and could restrict the United States’ ability to provide arms
to nonstate actors+ Most importantly, small-arms consumers—civilian gun owners
represented by the NRA—perceive international regulation as a threat to their pos-
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session and use of guns+58 The result of these conflicting incentives, especially the
powerful influence of the NRA, is weak American support for international regu-
lation of small arms ~regulation1!+ On the scope of the UN process, the United
States holds an intermediate position, arguing that the process should deal primar-
ily with the illicit trade, yet recognizing that certain aspects of the legal trade,
such as export control, should be addressed as well+ However, the United States
believes that the small-arms process should be based on political rather than legal
commitments, and sees no need for strengthening the existing compliance mech-
anism+ In the American view, implementation of the PoA depends on the political
will of governments; legal commitments or a stronger compliance mechanism will
not necessarily generate such will+ The United States particularly opposes the estab-
lishment of international rules on civilian possession of arms, seeing this as a
domestic issue+ It also opposes a comprehensive ban on arms transfers to unautho-
rized nonstate actors and argues for ascertaining the legitimacy and responsibility
of end-users on an individual basis+ Most importantly, the United States insists
that the UN process exclude ammunition, in contrast to the view held by many
other countries and expressed succinctly by the respondent from Sri Lanka: “A
gun without ammunition is just a stick+”
Additional Evidence
Government statements before and during the 2001 UN conference that adopted
the PoA provide a check on the survey data+ These public statements dovetail nicely
with survey responses+ Governments in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa
issued statements largely supportive of the UN process+ Senegal, for example, advo-
cated giving “absolute priority” to the fight against small-arms circulation and called
for a Program of Action that would include legally binding commitments+59 Con-
sistent with the survey data, the American and Chinese statements were less enthu-
siastic+ The Unites States indicated its opposition to “measures that would constrain
legal trade and legal manufacturing of small arms” and expressed a preference for
non-legally binding commitments+60 China emphasized the importance of confin-
ing the UN small-arms process to the illicit trade alone+61
The adoption of the PoA in July 2001 overshadowed another agreement on small
arms adopted only two months earlier: Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing
of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, sup-
plementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
~Firearms Protocol!+ As survey respondents noted, the Firearms Protocol had been
58+ LaPierre 2006+
59+ Statement by Senegal during the General Debate of the First Committee, 55th Session of the
UN General Assembly, 4 October 2000+
60+ Statement by the United States during the UN Conference on Small Arms, 9 July 2001+
61+ Statement of the Representative of China at the First Preparatory Committee for the UN Con-
ference on Small Arms, 29 February 2000+
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marginalized compared with the PoA+ This marginalization is consistent with the
large variation in government preferences documented here+ Countries favoring
weak international regulation, especially major arms-exporting countries such as
China, were willing to accept the non-legally binding PoA; however, they have
declined to ratify the legally binding Firearms Protocol+ In fact, ratification of the
Protocol follows the cross-regional preference variation depicted in Figure 2+ The
Protocol has been ratified primarily by countries in Africa, Latin America, and
Europe and has achieved few ratifications in the Middle East, East and South Asia,
and the Pacific; the United States has also not ratified the Protocol+ Firearms Pro-
tocol ratification and regulation—the survey-based measure of government
preferences—are positively correlated ~Spearman correlation coefficient is 0+24,
significant at 0+01 level!+
Preference Variation and Small-Arms Cooperation
In the absence of legally binding force and a meaningful enforcement mechanism,
the PoA could hardly be considered an appropriate international response to the
devastating consequences of small-arms proliferation and misuse+ The respondent
from Tanzania put it bluntly: this document “does not force anyone to do any-
thing+” The reason is the large variation in government preferences, which several
survey respondents indeed highlighted as a primary obstacle to international reg-
ulation+ They pointed out that governments vary dramatically in their interests,
priorities, and expectations+ Some are concerned about the daily killing of inno-
cent victims, while others guard the commercial interests of arms exporters+ For
the African governments, the small-arms process is a top priority, while certain
Arab governments consider the process to be a distraction from their priority—
nuclear disarmament+ Many governments would like to address the issues of civil-
ian possession and nonstate actors, which are a taboo for others+African respondents
decried the unwillingness of arms-exporting countries to take full responsibility
for the harm they generate and their reluctance to accept international controls+
Why did the preference variation pose an insurmountable obstacle, resulting in
a weak international regulatory framework in 2001 and a deadlock at the 2006
Review Conference? First, international small-arms regulation aims to restrain arms-
exporting countries and requires their cooperation+ Since international regulation
rejected by arms-exporting countries would be nearly futile, these countries enjoy
superior bargaining power+ Second, the small-arms conferences in 2001 and 2006
were consensus-based—an agreement required the consent of all participating
countries—and this decision rule further amplified exporting countries’ bargain-
ing advantage+Arms-exporting countries favoring weak regulation effectively held
a veto power, which allowed them to secure outcomes that met their preferences+
Survey respondents noted the advantage of a consensus-based approach—having
all countries on board—alongside a major drawback: the process reflects the low-
est common denominator+ Third, and most importantly, the distribution of power
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favors regulation opponents+ The African governments, the primary proponents of
the UN small-arms process, lack the resources and bargaining power necessary to
establish a successful issue linkage; nor is the exercise of coercion a realistic option
for them+ The cooperative outcome therefore conforms to the preference for weak
regulation of countries such as the United States, China, Egypt, and Iran+ The gov-
ernments of these countries sought an agreement that would reflect concern about
the grave problem of small arms, but would lack teeth+ The PoA was indeed that+
As explained above, the weakness of the PoA contrasts with TRIPS and the
international drug regime+ In those cases, pro-regulation governments exploited
their power advantage to make noncooperative governments accept stringent inter-
national control+ The PoA is also weak compared with arms control agreements
such as the NPT—a legally binding treaty that includes monitoring and verifica-
tion arrangements+ First, the establishment of the two agreements posed different
cooperation problems+ The NPT involved a set of distributional concerns: at the
Treaty’s inception, much uncertainty surrounded the distribution of gains+62 In the
case of small arms, by contrast, the problem is absence of shared interest in coop-
eration+ For certain governments, international regulation of small arms yields no
gains; rather, it makes them worse off+ Consequently, the conflict of preferences is
more intense than was the case with the NPT+ Second, the NPT rewarded coun-
tries that agreed to forgo nuclear weapons through transfer of peaceful nuclear
technology+ The African governments could not offer an equivalent reward to over-
come resistance to small-arms regulation and had to accept a cooperative outcome
that did not fulfill their wishes and expectations+
Conclusion
The trade in goods such as small arms, drugs, and antiquities and the problems it
raises are hardly a new phenomenon+ Yet, the increasing openness of the global
economy has given a significant boost to these kinds of trade+ Economic liberal-
ization and improvements in communication and transportation have facilitated
international transactions in these goods63 and have increased the harm associated
with them worldwide+ From civil wars sustained by the supply of small arms to
the social costs of widespread drug abuse, the negative externalities of trade con-
stitute a major threat to human welfare+
Nevertheless, these kinds of trade have been understudied by international rela-
tions scholars and have received little attention in the trade literature+ Scholars
who have examined them have typically done so within a crime framework+ The
provision of arms to rebels and terrorists, drug trafficking, and similar transna-
tional flows have been seen as part of an illicit and clandestine global economy in
62+ Koremenos 2001, 305–8+
63+ See Andreas 2002; and Raustiala 1999+
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which the main actors are criminal groups and networks+64 Accordingly, efforts
against these commercial activities have been studied as policing and crime-
control endeavors+65 This article has offered a new theoretical perspective on the
subject that normalizes these types of trade+ Instead of treating them as illegal
activities that take place in the shadows, outside the parameters of the mainstream
economy, I have sought to integrate them into mainstream political economy analy-
sis by employing the lens of trade regulation+ This new analytical lens provides
valuable tools to examine the motivations and conduct of societal actors and gov-
ernments+ Furthermore, contrary to the focus of existing accounts on criminal actors,
this article has shifted the attention to the legitimate links in the chain that are the
targets of international regulation—actors such as arms manufacturers who sell
guns indiscriminately, indifferent to the negative effects of their business+ Ulti-
mately, while the trade in small arms, drugs, and similar goods has crime and law
enforcement aspects, it does not follow an entirely distinct criminal logic+ Analy-
sis of trade regulation yields a better understanding of political conflicts and of
cooperative outcomes than does thinking in terms of crime+
This article has also suggested that trade policy is shaped by a larger variety of
influences than those the trade policy literature has highlighted: trade’s negative
externalities for society, governments’ own interests as exporters or consumers,
and moral concerns about welfare abroad+ Moral concerns have indeed occupied
an increasing role in trade policymaking in recent years+66 Notable examples are
the inclusion of human rights provisions in preferential trade agreements67 and
the controversy over developing countries’ access to affordable AIDS medica-
tions+ Yet trade policy models remain interest-based, failing to capture the grow-
ing weight of normative convictions, values, and moral beliefs in trade policy+ As
human rights issues seep into the WTO and as governments increasingly seek to
reconcile trade and human rights policies, trade policy analysis can no longer be
based solely on material factors while overlooking the impact of values and moral
views+ Both dimensions—the material and the ideational—shape many of the con-
temporary debates over trade, and if our lens remained focused on the former and
insensitive to the latter, we would miss an important part of the picture+
The article’s main policy implication concerns the merit of nonglobal coopera-
tion+ While global cooperation may be desirable, conflicting government prefer-
ences could render it weak+ In those circumstances, limited cooperation between
governments with homogeneous preferences offers a second-best alternative+ Espe-
cially within a region or subregion, where government preferences are relatively
aligned, cooperation may have better chances of success than globally+ Indeed,
while the UN small-arms process has failed to establish meaningful global coop-
64+ Examples include Friman 2009; and Naím 2005+
65+ Andreas and Nadelmann 2006+
66+ Aaronson and Zimmerman 2008+
67+ Hafner-Burton 2005+
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eration,African governments have made progress in curbing gun violence through
several regional and subregional agreements+68 Assistance from donor countries to
governments in Africa and elsewhere has also facilitated a variety of measures,
such as implementation of gun legislation and weapon destruction+ These limited
initiatives do not fully compensate for the weakness of global cooperation and the
reluctance of arms-exporting countries to establish proper controls, but they cer-
tainly help mitigate a devastating problem+ When global cooperation is thwarted
by conflicting government preferences, smaller-scale collaboration among like-
minded governments could prove more fruitful+
68+ For example, ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and
Other Related Materials, adopted in 2006; and the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and
Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, adopted
in 2004+
TABLE A1. Countries included in the survey
Albania Ecuador Lithuania Serbia
Algeria Egypt Macedonia Sierra Leone
Angola Eritrea Malawi Slovakia
Argentina Estonia Malaysia Slovenia
Armenia Ethiopia Mali Somalia
Australia Fiji Malta South Africa
Austria Finland Mauritania Spain
Bangladesh France Mexico Sri Lanka
Belarus Gabon Moldova Sudan
Belgium Gambia Morocco Sweden
Benin Georgia Mozambique Switzerland
Bolivia Germany Namibia Syria
Botswana Guatemala Nepal Tanzania
Brazil Haiti Netherlands Thailand
Britain Honduras New Zealand Togo
Bulgaria Hungary Nicaragua Turkey
Cambodia India Niger Turkmenistan
Canada Indonesia Nigeria Uganda
Chile Iran Norway Ukraine
China Ireland Pakistan United States
Colombia Israel Papua New Guinea Uruguay
Congo, Democratic Republic of Italy Paraguay Venezuela
Congo, Republic of Japan Peru Yemen
Costa Rica Jordan Philippines Zambia
Cote d’Ivoire Kazakhstan Poland Zimbabwe
Croatia Kenya Portugal
Cuba Korea, Republic of Qatar
Cyprus Kyrgyzstan Romania
Czech Republic Lesotho Russia
Denmark Liberia Saudi Arabia
Dominican Republic Libya Senegal
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Appendix. Selected Survey Questions69
Q3+ Some believe that the UN small-arms process should address only the illicit trade in
small arms+ Others believe that the process should address both the legal and the illicit
trade+ What is @country name# position?
Q4+ The Program of Action is a political rather than legally binding document+ Is @coun-
try name# content with the PoA being a political document, or would @country name# have
preferred a legally binding PoA?
Q6+ The Program of Action includes a mechanism for compliance and implementation
that is based on biennial meetings of states to consider the Program’s implementation and
on voluntary submission of national reports+ Is @country name# content with the existing
mechanism, or would @country name# have preferred a stronger mechanism or a weaker
one?
Q8+ Does @country name# support the establishment of a transparency mechanism for
small-arms transfers, such as the expansion of the UN Register of Conventional Arms to
include small arms?
Q11+ Does @country name# support the establishment of an international rule prohibiting
small-arms transfers to unauthorized nonstate actors?
Q13+ Does @country name# support the establishment of an international rule prohibiting
the transfer of small arms if the arms might be used for violation of human rights?
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